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Moral Repugnance as a 
Source in Moral Analysis 
by 
The Rev. Edwin L. Lisson, S.J., S.T.D. 
The author is professor of Moral Theology at St Louis University 
The contemporary moral and magisterial discussion regarding Artificial 
Hydration and Nutrition (AHN) with regard to the patient in the Permanent 
Vegetative State (PVS) focuses primarily around three "quaestiones disputatae':· 
(1) whether AHN is "ordinary nursing care" or "medical treatment"; (2) whether 
the PVS patient is "terminally ill" or not; and (3) the benefit/burden calculus for 
such patients. To move this discussion along, or at least off dead center, perhaps 
assuming a new viewpoint or a fresh stance would help. Can the PVS patient be 
viewed as living in a "foreign state," in a culture and condition that the 
"communis aestimatio hominum" would consider morally repugnant and hence 
morally impossible? 
Actually this is not a new viewpoint, but one that has proven useful and 
effective in the Catholic moral tradition. The following casus conscientiae might 
suggest that the contemporary dialogue between magisterium and theologians 
regarding AHN for PVS patients might reconsider the salient and relevant moral 
consideration of moral repugnance. 
Casus Conscientiae 
I have a penitent, David, the son of a widowed mother and a man in ordinary 
circumstances oflife, who has developed consumption. He is in very poor health at 
present, and has been told by many reputable physicians, who have carefully 
examined him that he cannot live more than one year unless he remove himself 
from this climate and betake himself to the Rocky Mountains, where, ifhis health 
improves, he would have to stay for four or five years. There is no certainty, 
however, that even there he will recover his shattered health. Now David is not 
inclined to follow the advice of the doctors. He feels that it would be imposing too 
great a hardship on himself and upon his mother. He dreads the life he will be 
compelled to lead in the mountains, and declares that he prefers to remain, and 
die if must be, at home, where he can receive some consolation from his parent, 
and where he can be of help to her. I would like to know whether there is any 
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obligation on his part to go to the mountains? Does he commit sin by not going? 
Answer: ... It is our view that the conditions under which David labors, and 
which beget in him a repugnance to a change of climate and a long residence in 
the mountains, with consequent separation from home and his mother, may 
rightly be looked upon as out of the ordinary. Therefore we hold that he is not 
obliged to submit himself to them, and consequently he does not sin by refusing to 
accept the dictum of his physician. He may be counseled to go, but he cannot be 
compelled to do so under pain of sin. The hardship, the expense, the mental pain, 
the loneliness and the fact that after all he may not ultimately recover, all these 
conspire to make the remedy an extraordinary one. This case and its solution by 
an anonymous author appeared in Homiletic and Pastoral Review in May 1916.1 
In 1950 Gerald Kelly cited this case in his classic article, "The Duty of Using 
Artificial Means of Preserving Life." Kelly began with the observation: 
The solution of many problems concerning the duty of preserving life undoubtedly 
depends on a prudent communis aesti1rUltio of the factors involved in the problems .... In 
other words, an extraordinary means is one which prudent men would consider at least 
morally impossible with reference to the duty of preserving one's life.2 
To those unfamiliar with the Manual Tradition the term "morally impossible" 
may be problematic. It is one thing to describe the "physically impossible" as 
being in two distant places at one time or scratching behind your right ear with 
your left foot. However, it is more of a challenge to define or describe types of 
actions which for a given individual might be so psychically repugnant or so 
psychologically difficult that that action would be "morally impossible" for that 
individual. As such that individual would not be held culpable for an acting or 
not acting in ways which s/he would otherwise be obligated. Thus, in the clinical 
situation, one might find a patient with widespread cancer for whom radical 
surgery or the complications of chemotherapy or radiation are so personally 
abhorrent that however much the physicians recommend, even cajole, that 
patient could not morally submit. 
Both the term and the concept "moral impossibility" appear as a basic moral 
principle in the classic manuals, such as Genicot-Salsmans, which Kelly cites. 
This principle is often practically applied in the discussion of ordinary and 
extraordinary means of prolonging life. For example, in his treatment of the Vth 
Commandment, Genicot states: 
No one is bound to preserve their health or bodily integrity by exceedingly 
extraordinary means (n. 134). Consequently, no one is obligated to take up residence in a 
foreign place, to travel to distant spas, or to undertake the burden of financial strain even 
if he cannot prolong his life any other way.3 
Previously, in the discussion offactors which might excuse or exempt one from 
the obligations of a moral law (n. 134), Genicot explicitly grounds the concept of 
extraordinary means within the principle of "moral impossibility:" 
54 
In general, the obligation of a positive law ceases when its observation per accidens is 
conjoined with serious risk or inconvenience.4 
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In the following paragraph, Genicot specifies the meaning of per accidens: 
"Per accidens" means that the inconvenience arises from the observation of the law, 
or is extrinsic to the law, and not from the law itself. Certain laws, for example, the divine 
law of integrity of confession, of their very nature include very great difficulties which in 
particular cases still do diminish the obligation of those laws. 
As regards human laws, the idea of this principle is that observance of a law should be 
morally possible (n.83). As regards divine laws, there is the added prudent presumption 
that God would not enforce his law where obvious extraordinary difficulties would 
change the obligations. - The physically impossible would all the more be excused 
because no one is obligated to (do) the impossible.s 
In Note 83, mentioned in this paragraph, Genicot follows the traditional 
definition of Law: 
In a wide sense the moral law is the right reason of doing or omitting. In a narrower 
sense, according to S1. Thomas, (law) is defined: The ordering of reason to the common 
good promulgated by the one who has responsibility for the (good of the) community.6 
The following paragraph defines the necessary conditions for a valid (ut valeat) 
law . 
Such a law must be virtuous (honesta), equitable (justa) and: 
It (the law) should not only be physically but also morally possible (to observe). It 
should not be exceptionally difficult for the greater part of the community, considering 
the customs and culture of the place where the law is to be applied.7 
In summation, in the manual tradition, moral repugnance in the sense of moral 
impossibility articulates the concept that any moral law which is physically or 
morally impossible to fulfill, cannot, of itself oblige. Note especially that the 
meaning of moral impossibility is relative to "the majority of the community 
considering the customs and culture of the place." This last consideration will be 
particularly salient in the discussion to follow. 
Moral Repugnance in the Manuals 
As far back as the 13th Century, the concept of "moraliter possibilis" was an 
operative principle of moral discourse in the great Summas and Manuals of 
Moral Theology. Particularly in the expanding body of moral reflection upon 
issues of life and health, the concept of what is "morally possible" is particularly 
explicit and operative. 
The great Canonist and Master General ofthe Dominican order, Raymond of 
Penafort (d. 1275) specifically obliged physicians to give normal care which 
includes food and drink.8 The first explicit treatment of witholding medical 
treatments, including hydration and nutrition, and hence, implicitly the idea of 
ordinary vs. extra-ordinary means to prolong life is found in the magnificent 
Relectiones of the great Spanish Moralist Francisco de Victoria. In his lectures of 
1520, on the virtue of temperance in eating and drinking, Victoria explicitly 
addressed ethical questions associated with fasting. In this context, he proceeded 
to analyze the limits of medical treatment with specific reference to nourishment 
and to medicines. In the case of a sick person's refusal of food and the potentially 
mortal (physical and moral) consequence, suicide, Victoria concluded that, 
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objectively, the sick person is obligated to take food for the preservation of bodily 
life, only ifthere is some "reasonable hope oflife."9 However, ifthe patient is so 
depressed that taking food becomes "a kind of impossibility," subjectively then 
the patient is not commtting sin. Interestingly, in another lecture Victoria adds 
that with reference to kinds or quality of food, no one is required to use the best or 
most expensive food, even if such foods would objectively be more nutritious. lo 
Granted the premise that one is not obliged to use every means possible, 
especially if the patient is dying, Victoria argued further that medicinal drugs are 
not per se obligatory. However, if one has "moral Certitude" that a particular 
drug would indeed restore a patient to health then that drug for that patient 
becomes like ordinary food, obligatory. 
Thus, early in the 16th century the concept, if not the explicit terms, of 
ordinary vs extraordinary means of prolonging life were operative in the Catholic 
moral tradition. Indeed, in the practice of 15th century medicine, many drugs 
could be considered experimental or, at best, questionably effective and hence the 
obligation to use them rested upon the degree of certitude of their effectiveness. 
Consequently, in dealing with one's obligation to use drugs, Victoria applied the 
same cost/benefit analysis as he did with "delicate foods" and concluded that one 
is not obliged to sacrifice one's whole means of subsistence, nor one's general 
lifestyle, nor one's homeland in order to acquire a cure or to maintain optimum 
health (emphasis added). II 
Victoria's successor in the Chair of Salamanca, Domingo De Soto, O.P. (d 
1560) moved the discussion of extraordinary means from food and medicines to 
the practice of surgery. Prior to the discovery of anesthesia and asepsis, surgical 
procedures not only involved bodily mutilation and disfigurement but also 
certain and excruciating pain along with very high risk of death from infection. 
DeSoto thus explicitly argued that surgery such as amputation of a limb, because 
of the inevitable accompanying pain ought to be categorically optional. "Such 
torture," according to DeSoto, "was beyond the limits that the 'common man' 
ought be obliged to suffer for one's bodily health." DeSoto concluded that 
excruciating pain rendered an otherwise medically beneficial surgery "morally 
impossible" to bear.12 
Along the same lines, one of the first Jesuit moralists, Louis Molina (d. 1600) 
argued that because man has been constituted the custodian and administrator of 
his own life and members, without his consent, no one can cut a member from 
him for the sake of curing him or apply any other medicinal remedy to him ... "13 
Molina states "The conclusion proposed, therefore, is understood only when it is 
not entirely certain that the remedy will be of profit for avoiding the grave harm 
of a neighbor; or when the remedy is such that, beca~e of too intense a pain or 
other legitimate reason, he is not obliged to undergo that which he needs in order 
to conserve his life or members."14 
Interestingly it was Molina's archenemy, Dominican Domigo Banez, who first 
introduced the specific terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary" into the discussion 
of obligatory and non-obligatory means for preserving life. Banez upheld the 
reasonableness of the positive duty to sustain human life, but insisted that one is 
"not bound to extraordinary means but to common food and clothing, to 
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common medicines, and to a certain common and ordinary pain."15 
Juan DeLugo, S.J. (d 1660) made the next significant contribution to the 
discussion with the distinction "parum pro nihil reputatur': i.e., very little is to be 
considered as nothing. DeLugo started from the traditional casuistry on the 
Lenten fast laws. In regard to nibbling between meals during the Lenten Fast, 
DeLugo's opinion was,parum pro nihil reputatur. ''16 On this basis, DeLugo went 
on to argue that food must be taken only if beneficial or proportionately useful. 
For example, a man with only one bucket of water is not obligated to try to put 
out a burning building. From this perspective, DeLugo argued that no one is 
obligated to purchase expensive food or seek out rare medicines. In the genre of 
good casuistry, DeLugo offered the case of a novice who has been ordered by his 
superior to leave the monastery for health reasons. DeLugo argued that the 
otherwise obedient novice might legitimately refuse this order because the food in 
the community is "common" to his status oflife.'7 
Before the suppression of the Jesuits in 1773, perhaps their most influential 
moralist was Herman Busembaum of Cologne (d. 1668). In the 1654 edition of 
his Medulla Theologiae Moralis, under heading of the Vth Commandment, with 
deference to such distinguished predecessors as Victoria, Vasques, Diana, et al. 
Busembaum presents the classic case of the "very sick" Carthusian monk: 
Although a critically ill Carthusian monk could prolong his life by eating meat, which 
is probably allowable, it is permissible, even praiseworthy for him to refuse (meat) when 
death is certainly near because he is reasonably giving up his life for the common good of 
the order.18 
In addition to the terminally ill monk, Busembaum offers a second illustrative 
case of "moral repugnance:" 
It would seem that a young girl who is ill is not obligated to submit to the treatment of 
a physician or surgeon when this would be so exceptionally distasteful that she would 
prefer death itself.19 
Succeeding Busembaum as Professor of Moral Theology at Cologne, Claude de 
La Croix, S.J. (d 1714) retained the structure and content his predecessor's 
writing and noted that the moral obligations of prolonging life are not the same 
associated with conserving life. 
After the suppression of the Jesuit Order, much of Busembaum's writing was 
incorporated into the works of St. Alphonsus Liguori (d. 1787) and through him 
continued to influence both the shape and the content of Catholic Moral 
Theology well into the 20th Century. Interestingly, in discussing moral 
repugnance, Liguori cites Busembaum's example of the young girl who would 
find it morally impossible to be examined or treated by a physician. Writing a 
century later, Ligouri added, "A young girl who would find it repugnant to be 
examined or touched by a male physician can, indeed should, accept medical 
treatment from another woman."20 
Although anesthesia had been discovered and was in widespread use in the 
first half of the 19th century, in the second half of that century the Jesuit Antonio 
Ballerini (d. 1881) and the Redemptorist Clement Mark, (d. 1887) due to the 
uncertainties and danger, continued to consider anesthesia and procedures which 
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depend upon anesthesia to be extraordinary means and thus not obligatory. By 
the early 20th century, however, along with the advances in medicine in general 
and anethesia in particular we find significant developments in the opinions of 
Catholic moralists. The German Jesuit August Lehmkuhl (d. 1918) was one of 
the first to state that, simply from the aspect of pain, a surgical operation could no 
longer be considered an extraordinary menas. However, Lehmkuhl did 
distinguish between pain and ho"or and concluded that one need not be bound 
to undergo an operation that one views with a great deal of repulsion even though 
there may not be any actual pain involved.21 Here again, moral repugnance is a 
significant moral determinant of what constitutes ordinary versus extraordinary 
means of prolonging life. 
Jerome Noldin, Jesuit moralist of Innsbruck (d. 1922), argued that 
amputations were now obligatory (ordinary means) since there exists the 
possibility of attaching artificial limbs, and one has the obligation to preserve 
one's life even with some bodily defect. On the other hand, Noldin specifically 
stated that a physician may stop nutrition and hydration if the patient is 
spiritually prepared to die. For Noldin, it should be the communis aestimato 
hominum that determines what is ordinary means. On the other side, Noldin's 
Dominican colleague, Dominic Prummer (d 1931) however, disagreed and 
continued to argue, well into the 1930's, that any surgical operation which is 
extremely painful or burdensome, such as the amputation of both arms,should be 
considered an extraordinary means: "Moral impossibility is present when the 
prescribed undertaking cannot be accomplished except through very 
extraordinary effort.22 
We have thus briefly traced the historical roots of the moral theory and 
illustrative examples of the "standard moralists" cited by Gerald Kelly in his 
classic article of June 1950. Moreover this tradition is apparent in Pope Pius XTI's 
Allocution of November 24th, 1957 in to the International Congress of 
Anesthesiologists. After first acknowledging that the means of diagnosing the 
moment of death was beyond the Church's competence, Pius brought the 
manualist tradition to focus explicitly upon the issues of resuscitation and 
artificial ventilation as life-prolonging measures: 
Normally one is held to use only ordinary means according to the circumstances of 
persons, places, times, and culture - that is to say, means that do not involve any grave 
burden for oneself or another. A more strict obligation would be too burdensome for 
most men and would render the attainment of higher, more important goods too difficult 
23 
Similar elements of the ordinary-extraordinary means tradition are found in 
Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia (1980). In turn, this document was 
incorporated, with criticisms, refinements, and additions, into the document of 
President Reagan's Commission on Bioethics on withdrawing and withholding 
life-prolonging measures published in 1983. 
Moving from the past to the present, we can now examine three recent 
statements by American bishops on the issue of AHN with a view to how the 
concept of "moral repugnance" explicitly or implicitly is a salient element of 
moral reflection upon this issue. 
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Texas Bishops' Statement 
The statement of the Texas bishops24 begins with a consideration of basic 
moral principles. After stating (1) "Although life always is a good, there are 
conditions which, if present lessen or remove one's obligation to sustain life," and 
(2) "If benefits outweigh the burden the means are morally obligatory ... " the 
Texas bishops then note: 
(3) If the means are disproportionately burdensome compared to the benefit the 
means need not be used, they are morally optional.2S 
Then citing the 1980 Vatican Declaration, the Texas bishops explicity note that 
The National Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee for Pro-Life Activities 
came to the same conclusion regarding the situation when the burden is 
disproportionate to the benefits in their statement on the proposed Uniform 
Rights of the Terminally m Act. That statement (July 2, 1986) allowed that 
"laws dealing with medical treatments may have to take account of exceptional 
circumstances where even the means for providing nourishment may become too 
ineffective or burdensome to be obligations."26 
Oregon and Washington Bishops 
The statement of the Oregon and Washington Bishops,27 in the section which 
discusses "Suffering and Pain in Human Life," refers, implicitly perhaps, to the 
concept of "moral repugnance:" 
The new problem in medical technology is that even when it cannot cure or relieve, it 
is sometimes able to delay the final experience of death beyond the point where the 
patient may value life or is capable of valuing anything at all .... Despite its uses, 
technological advance is frequently ambiguous. It has positive and negative aspects. 
When technology becomes an end in itself, the human use of technology becomes 
problematic. Growing numbers of persons have fears about the end of life, e.g., being 
kept alive in a persistent vegetative (or pemumently unconscious) stale unable to make 
their own decisions. (emphasis added)l' 
Similarly, in the section on "The Obligation to Sustain Life," the Oregon and 
Washington bishops cite Pius XII's 1957 Statement and the 1980 Vatican 
Declaration. The Oregon and Washington bishops then conclude: 
Thus it is appropriate to weigh the anticipated benefit of a medical treatment (e.g., a 
drug, an operation, a ventilator) and the burden it would impose on the patient (e.g., 
added pain, loss of limb or bodily function, high risk, serious financial burden) in 
asseSsing whether to provide, withhold or remove such medical treatment. [Note the 
omission or neglect of moral or psychic burden.1ln applying these principles, every 
consideration should be given to the reasonable wishes of the patient and the patient's 
family, and to the advice of competent physicians.29 
In an obvious parallel to the concept of "moral repugnance" the Oregon and 
Washington bishops continue: 
The fear of overtreatment some people have is increased when they have a general 
sense that it is time to die, to "let go," and this sense is not respected, but instead is 
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violated through the application of painful and expensive technologies to maintain life 
"at any COSt."30 
Following their section on "Nutrition and Hydration," the Oregon and 
Washington bishops note that both as infants and as aged many of us will need 
assistance in taking food and drink: 
Usual or normal eating and drinking must be continued as long as a person can 
tolerate it. It is generally not required to force persons to eat against their will ... Because 
human life has inherent value and dignity regardless of its condition, every patient should 
be provided with measures which can effectively preserve life without involving too 
grave a burden since food and water are necessities of life for all human beings and can 
generally be provided without risks and burdens of more aggressive means for sustaining 
life they always should establish a strong presumption in favor if their use.31 
The Oregon and Washington bishops conclude: 
The general principles of weighing the benefit to the person against the burdens 
imposed on him or her would seem to apply in such cases.32 
In the best tradition of Quaestiones disputatae the Oregon and W ashington ~ 
bishops explicitly note absence of consensus among "Conscientious Moral 
Theologians." Some, they note, argue that artificially administered nutrition 
should be seen as normal care, insofar as the patient is "not dying." Other 
moralists, "insist that AHN is not obligatory when the burdens clearly outweigh 
the benefits, and they believe this to be the case when the person has been 
medically diagnosed as permanently unconscious."33 Just as with dialysis 
machines and respirators, the use of burden/benefit proportionality would 
indicate if it is futile or burdensome or beneficial: 1 
Granted that due to the potential for relatives abusing patients' interests there should j 
be a presumption in favor of using AHN, concrete decisions "must be made on a 
case-by-case basis in light of the benefits and burdens they entail for the individual 
patient. (Thus) In appropriate circumstances, the decision to withhold these means of life 
support can be in accord with Catholic moral reasoning and ought to be respected by 
medical caregivers and the laws of the land.34 
Finally, the concept of "moral repugnance" appears in the section which 
promotes conscientious efforts at pain control: 
We cannot condone an atmosphere that would make it more appealing to have 
people dead than to provide what is necessary for them to live the last part of their lives 
with dignity and relieved from their pain.33 
Pennsylvania Bishops' Statement 
Under the heading "Principles of Decision Making,"36 the Pennsylvania 
bishops cite as sources of moral decision making "moral teaching, medical 
information, and the concrete condition and means of the patient and the 
patient's family."37 Which means do the Pennsylvania bishops intend here? 
Psychic, moral, physical, financial? 
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Questions of whether the procedure is "beneficial to the patient in terms of 
preservation of life or restoration of health ... must be directed to experts in the 
field of medicine ... "38 Here the Pennsylvania bishops seem to put "restoration of 
health" on the same level as "prolonging physical life." However the 
Pennsylvania bishops question whether: 
... the procedure is a grave burden to the patient, (communis aestimatio hominum?) 
and has that burden become unbearable or intolerable .. . patient or the patient's family? 
Judgments in this area must be tempered by the presence of the varying degrees of 
depression that any suffering patient or family may be experiencing. We must still 
recognize, however, the subjective aspect of "Unbearableness" and must respect moral 
judgments made in good conscience.39 
In explicitly addressing "Decisions in Relation to Nutrition and Hydration," 
the Pennsylvania bishops first note that most modern modes of taking food and 
drink are "to some extent artificial."40 Hence the real question regarding AHN 
must depend in the final analysis on something other than the distinction between 
artificial and natural means: 
Thus, if the supplying of nutrition and hydration is of benefit to the patient and causes 
no undue burden of pain or suffering or excessi ve expenditure of resources, then it is our 
duty to take and to provide that nutrition and hydration. If the burdens have far 
surpassed the benefits, then our obligation has ceased.41 
In the ensuing analysis of the terms "treatment" and "care" the Pennsylvania 
bishops observe: 
In the case of the immanently terminal patient one would suppose (communis 
aestimatio?) that treatment is intended to reverse the course of the disease or, at least, to 
better the condition of the patient. If it no longer does that, then its discontinuance is no 
more than a clear recognition of its futility . ... However, the PVS patient is not 
immediately terminal (provided that there is no other pathology present). (Hence) the 
feeding - regardless of whether it be considered as treatment or as care - is serving a 
life-sustaining purpose. "Therefore, it remains an ordinary means of sustaining life and 
should be continued."42 
In other words, for the Pennsylvania bishops, the distinction between treatment 
and care does not of itself help to resolve the moral problem. 
In analyzing more explicity the benefit/burden ratio under the heading of the 
"Patient's Medical Condition," the Pennsylvania bishops first state that although 
AHN of itself does oot restore health, " .. . it is clearly beneficial in terms of 
.. preservation of life, since death would be inevitable without it aod life will 
continue with it."43 The Pennsylvania bishops. thus ask, "Is it (AHN) adding a 
serious burden?" Their response: 
In almost every case the answer is negative. The means of supplying food in 
themselves are all relatively simple and - barring complications - generally without 
pain.44 
It is important to note here, that the assessment of the burden at this point is 
essentially that of physical pain. In the paragraphs discussing the "Patient's 
Internal Disposition," the Pennsylvania bishops distinguish pain as physical 
February, 1994 61 
sensation from pain as the affective response associated with human suffering. 
Moreover: 
· . . as the parts of the brain responsible for the specifically human qualities of 
anticipation and anguish that so affect human pain are precisely those parts which are 
not now functioning (in the PVS patient). Thus the response of the vegetative patient to 
noxious stimuli would indicate that there is a physical response to pain .. . (but) ... the 
affective level of human suffering is not present.4S 
The Pennsylvania Bishops go on to observe the fact that: 
· . . feeding methods do not generally carry with them the sometimes serious 
discomfort which would be found in the patient on a respirator.46 
At this point we could ask whether, if hydration and nutrition are discontinued 
will the affective level of human suffering also not be present? In this regard, the 
Pennsylvania bishops explicitly note: 
· .. with regard to "the discomfort of being in this condition for years, unable to 
communicate and unable to help oneself, it is not possible to make a final and decisive 
comment. If, indeed the patient is unconscious then there is no awareness of these 
inabilities, and, consequently, none of the anguish that would attend them."47 
Finally, the Pennsylvania bishops concede that much ofthis analysis is conjecture: 
If we could indeed establish that there is pain, and that there is, in fact considerable 
pain, then our answer might be different. Finally, that question, however, remains to be 
answered, although present consensus (communis aestimatio hominum?) argues against 
the existence of such pain, mental or physical."" 
Lastly, under the heading of "Family and Care Givers," the Pennsylvania 
bishops note the range and ambivalence of emotions that the family members 
may experience: 
The family members, however, must be careful not to allow their own fears or 
frustration to become the basis for the moral decision making that now falls to them. 
They must exercise for the one who is ill the same stewardship oflife that is the obligation 
of each of us in our own regard. The desire to escape from our own burdens cannot 
become the source of a decision which would end the life of someone else.49 
The next paragraph, acknowledges that some families act out of "far less 
worthy motives," such as anger, spite, greed, which makes it prudent to give 
benefit of the doubt "to the continued sustenance of the life of the unconscious 
person."so Interestingly the element of "moral repugnance," is quite explicit in the 
concluding observation: 
We must, however, take into real account situations in which the family has reached 
the morallimiLr of its abilities or its resources. In such a situation, they have done all that 
they can do and they are not morally obliged to do more. They WQuld then have reached 
the limits of ordinary means. SI 
Yet, they go on to add: 
62 
However, in the society in which we live this does not present a fully convincing 
argument. Resources are available from other sources and these can often be tapped 
before a family reaches dire financial straits. Such assistance has been and continues to be 
available. S2 
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Here again the Pennsylvania bishops seem to be thinking primarily of the 
depletion of the family's physical or financial "resources." However much 
resources may be forth coming to sustain their loved ones, and however distant 
their journey thus takes them from "dire financial straits," the "communis 
aestimatio hominum" might also seriously consider reasonable limits to the 
family's mental or psychic resources. If, in the present as in the past, ajourney to a 
distant mountain top or foreign land can be "morally repugnant" and thus 
"morally impossible" for the patient, might it not be equally "morally repugnant" 
and thus "morally impossible" for the family to send or to keep a loved one in 
such a "foreign" and "morally repugnant" state? 
The Roman moral tradition has clearly and consistently considered moving to 
or remaining in a foreign place or in an alien culture as morally repugnant and 
morally impossible. Such a condition is so unreasonable in the communis 
aestimatio hominum as to render that option "Extraordinary means" and as such 
not obligatory. Moreover,. in this context, the classical texts do not consider the 
conscious experience of physical pain as the only salient factor. Indeed, one might 
quite easily live in a foreign country without physical pain. The dry air of Spain 
may well alleviate the English person's breathing problems. Rather, it is the 
psychic pain of living in a foreign culture "away from family, friends, and 
accustomed sights and sounds" that renders the otherwise pain-free foreign 
existence morally repugnant. 
In discussing the ambivalent feelings of family and care givers, the 
Pennsylvania bishops noted that: 
It is not at all unusual that members of that family find themselves, at times, 
wondering if death would not be a better alternative for the one who is afflicted.S) 
In this context, the Pennsylvania bishops emphasize that, "Euthanasia's terms of 
reference are to be found in the intention of the will and in the methods used."54 
Here as in all other documents past and recent, condemning euthanasia, the 
"will" of the family member or caregiver is a critical element if determining 
whether an act or omission is truly euthanasia. In the case of the PVS patient one 
can ask whether the relative or caregiver truly, directly, or primarily desires the 
DEA TH ofthe PVS patient? Or would they not rejoice and be exceedingly glad 
should that patient "return from that foreign land" to once again share home and 
hearth with family and friends. But when the best, informed medical opinion 
suggests that such a return is neither imminent nor possible, then could not death 
be morally a lowab e, as less morally repugnant than continued living in such a 
fo reign state? 
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